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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
VOL. XXIV JUNE 1924 NO. 6
RECOGNITION OF NEW TYPES OF NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS
The expression "negotiable instrument" is one of variable mean-
ing, and what is meant thereby often can be determined only by the
context. After all it is merely a matter of classification, and the term
should be used not as of special significance in and of itself but only
as indicating certain legal features and consequences not common to
commercial instruments generally. Primarily "negotiable" indicates
transferability with a certain facility. Of almost equal importance has
been the quality of suability by the holder pro tempore. Another quality
commonly associated with negotiability is the possibility that a transferee
may aquire on the instrument better rights than those assertable by his
transferor. This quality, however, is not a necessary attribute of nego-
tiability, for while an overdue promissory note is clearly a negotiable
instrument a transferee can stand no better, at least so far as rights
growing out of the promissory undertaking are concerned, than his
transferor. If the transferee in a given controversy is held to have ac-
quired better rights, it is likely, as will appear hereafter, that it is be-
cause the document is negotiable. This, however, is not necessarily the
explanation.
It may be not without interest to consider how instruments gain
the negotiable quality and to trace, sketchily perhaps, the process of
recognition. Finally some inquiry may be attempted as to the possible
effect of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law upon the freedom
of growth of commercial paper along these lines.
While the Law Merchant as a body of rules and principles accord-
ing to which justice was administered in certain types of litigation in
certain special courts may fairly be said to have been absorbed' by
'When the common law courts first authoritatively declared their willing-
ness and intention to be govcrned by the rules and principles of the Law Mer-
chant in settling litigation involving commercial disputes, then it was, it is
submitted, that the Law Merchant wvas Absorbed. Whether the content of the
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the common law as early as the latter half of the seventeenth century2
it must not be assumed that thereafter established and approved cus-
toms of merchants ceased to be important factors in determining the
legal status of commercial instruments and the rights, duties, etc., of
parties in reference thereto. Customs of merchants are and probably
will continue to be sources of law, but it is believed that it is un-
necessarily cumbersome if not actually misleading to speak of the Law
Merchant as something nowadays existing outside the field of our com-
mon and statute law.
3
The outstanding instrument developed under the Law Merchant
to which the qualities of negotiability became attached was of course
the bill of exchange. To this perhaps the promissory note may be added.
It is, however, a matter of some doubt whether promissory notes as
we now know them were not dependent upon legislative action for their
status along with bills of exchange.4 At any rate there can be no doubt
Law Merchant, application of which was to be made in a particular case, was
to be determined by testimony, knowledge of the jurors, judicial notice by the
court, or by extra-judicial consultation with merchants would seem to have
been immaterial in this matter. Also in this respect it would not seem to be
a vital circumstance that only from time to time as occasion arose would a
particular rule or doctrine of the Law Merchant be recognized and applied.
'In Anon. (1668) Hardres, 485, 486, at the conclusion of the argument,
the Chief Baron said: "And it were worth while to enquire, what the course
has been among merchants; or to direct an issue for trial of the custom amongst
merchants in this case. For although we must take notice in general of the
law of merchants; yet all their customs we cannot know but by information."
In the same year in Carter v. Downish, 1 Show. 127, 130, Pollexfen, C. J., said:
"As to that of the law of merchants, I think we are bound to take notice of it."
...... And in Mogadara v. Holt (1690), I Show. 317, 318, it was laid down that:
........ it is no more than the law of merchants, and that is jus gentium, and
we are to take notice of it ....... See also Williams v. Williams (1692)
Carth. 269, 270, where it was said that "this custom of merchants concerning
bills of exchange is part of the common law, of which the judges will take
notice."
'For example, in Edelstein v. Schuler & Co. [1902] 2 K. B. 144, Bigham,
J., said '(p. 155) : "Thus it has been found convenient to treat securities like
those in question [debenture bonds] in this action as negotiable, and the courts
of law, recognizing the wisdom of the usage, have incorporated it in what is
called the law merchant, and have made it part of the common law of the
country." It is submitted that when there is the proper showing of the usage
with reference to an appropriate instrument it is quite unnecessary to con-
sider that the document is thereby negotiable by an existing law merchant
and then to declare that such doctrine of such law merchant is part of the
body of the common law. It is the common law which directly and immedi-
ately attaches the consequence.
'The impatience of Lord Holt with the merchants of Lombard Street
'as appears from the report of Clerke v. Mlartin (1702) 2 Ld. Raym. 757, and
his attitude in that case towards promissory notes which led to the enactment
of the Statute of Anne, (1704) St. 3 & 4- Anne, c. 9, are familiar td all. See
Aigler, Commercial Instruments (1924) 8 Minn. Law Rev. 366 et seq. Whether
the negotiability of promissory notes rests on the Statute of Anne or whether,
on the other hand, that enactment simply restored the rule of the Law Merchant
is discussed elsewhere. See Judge Cranch's article in 3 Ames, Select Essays,
72, 89-93; Holdsworth, Origins & Early History of Negotiable Instruments
(1916) 32 Law Q. Rev. 20, 34-37.
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that after 1704, promissory notes were on the same footing as bills of
exchange.
Bank bills were early recognized as quite unlike ordinary chattel
property. A case before Lord Holt, in 1699, involved a bank bill pay-
able to A or bearer; A lost the bill, which was found by a stranger, who
transferred it for a valuable consideration to C. The learned Chief
Justice is reported as saying: "A may have trover against the stranger
who found the bill, for he had no title, though the payment to him
would have indemnified the bank; but A cannot maintain trover against
C by reason of the course of trade, which creates a property in the
assignee or bearer."5 A few years later, however, in Ford v. Hopkins,
6
views regarding bank notes quite at variance with the above are attri-
buted to the same judge.7  But the case before the court was one of
trover for million-lottery tickets, a depositary having wrongfully turned
over to the defendant some tickets belonging to the plaintiff. Whatever
doubt may thus have been cast upon the status of bank notes was set
at rest by the well-known decision of Lord Mansfield in Miller v. Race,"
where it was held that a good faith purchaser of a stolen bank note ac-
quired a property therein.9
The status of Exchequer bills10 was definitely settled in Wookey
Anon., 1 Salk. 126.
6 (1701) 1 Salk. 283.
"If money is stolen and paid to another, the owner of the money can
have no remedy against him that received it; but if bank-notes, Exchequer-
notes, or million-tickets, or the like, are stolen or lost, the owner has such an
interest or property in them, as to bring an action into whatsoever hands they
are come: money or cash is not to be distinguished, but these notes or bills are
distinguishable, and cannot be reckoned as cash, and they have distinct marks
and numbers on them." See as to this last point Wookey v. Pole (1820) 4 B.
& Ald. 1, 7.
" (1758) 1 Burr. 452.
'In the course of his opinion Lord Mansfield said: "The case of Ford and
Hopkins was also cited ...... But this must be a very incorrect report of that
case: it is impossible that it can be a true representation of what Ld. Ch. J.
Holt said. It represents him as speaking of Bank-notes, Exchequer-notes,
and inillion-lottery tickets, as like to each other. Now no two things can be
more unlike to each other than a lottery-ticket and a bank note ...... The per-
son who took down this case, certainly misunderstood Lord Ch. J. Holt, or
mistook his reasons" etc. See also Lee, C. J., in Hartop v. Hoare (1743) 3
Atk. 44, at p. 50. Accord, Raphael v. Bk. of England (1855) 17 C. B. 161.
"The language of such bills was as follows:
"No: 8333, 12 May, 1817.
"By virtue of an act of parliament quinquagesimo Septimo Geo. 3, Regis,
for raising the sum of 24,000,000 by exchequer bills, for the service of the
year 1817, this bill entitles or order, to one thousand pounds, with interest
after the rate of 2Y2 d. per centum per diem, payable out of the first aids or
supplies to be granted the next session of parliament, and this bill is to be
current and pass in any of the public revenues, aids, taxes, or supplies, or at
the receipt of exchequer at Westminster after the 5th day of April. Dated at
the Exchequer the 12th day of May 1817. If the blank is not filled up, the
bill will be payable to bearer.
"Greenville.
"N. B. The cheques must not be cut off."
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v. Pole,1' where it was held that a defendant who in good faith had
purchased the bill in question from a faithless agent of the plaintiff
was not liable in trover. Such bills were considered as having the same
circulating properties as bank niotes and bills of exchange, all of them
being representatives of money, as to which it had been laid down as
long ago as 1599, in Higgs v. Holiday,2 that "when he [the owner of
money] had lost the possession thereof he had lost the property also,
because it cannot be known."3  While the Act of Parliament under
which the bills were issued clearly contemplated that they should be put
into circulation the emphasis of the court was placed upon the fact
that the instruments by their terms called ultimately for the payment of
money to the holder, who might become such either by delivery or by
indorsement and delivery, and the further fact that it appeared that
they were actually negotiated "in like manner as other bills or notes,
though not to the same extent, or among all people generally, but con-
fined chiefly to those who deal in money."'4
In Maclish v. Ekins5 a navy bill payable to A and his assigns was
held unlike .money, so one who took the bill from an agent of the
owner but not pursuant to authority was liable in trover. There is
nothing in the report indicating that such bills customarily circulated.
The case of Goldsnzyd and Another v. Gaden'6 is hardly sufficiently
well authenticated to upset the Maclish case.
The attitude of the courts towards recognition of qualities of ne-
gotiability as being attached to documents other than bills and notes,
"Supra, footnote 7.
(1599) Cro. Eliz. 746.
(Italics the writer's). As to this Best, J., in Wookey v. Pole, said: "It
is not because the loser cannot know his money again that he cannot re-
cover it from a person who has fairly obtained the possession of it; for if his
guineas or shillings had some private marks on them by which he could prove
they had been his, he could not get them back from a bona fide holder. The
true reason of this rule is, that by the use of money the interchange of all
other property is most readily accomplished. To fit it for its purpose the
stamp denotes its value, and possession alone must decide to whom it belongs."
In Miller v. Race, Lord Mansfield was expressing essentially the same idea
when he said: "It has been quaintly said, 'that the reason why money cannot
be followed is, because it has no ear-mark': but this is not true. The true rea-
son is, upon the currency of it: it cannot be recovered after it has passed in
currency."1 Bayley, J., dissented, being of the opinion that the bills were to be classed
with other saleable goods and chattels.
See also Brandao v. Barnett (1846) 12 Cl. & Fin. 787, in which Exchequer
bills were assumed to be negotiable. Lord Halsbury says that such bills were
issued first in 1695, "but are now regulated by the Exchequer Bills and Bonds
Act, 1866, as amended by the Treasury Bills Act, 1877." He points out further
that their place is now to a great extent taken by Treasury bills. See 2 Hals-
bury%, Laws of England (1908) 565, 566.
(1753) Sayer 73.
'* Cited by counsel in argument in Collins v. Martin (1797) 1 Bos. & Pul.
648, as having been decided in Chancery, June 13, 1796.
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including such instruments as above discussed, is well shown by the
opinion of Lord Cranworth in Dixon v. Bovill.1 .7 The action was based
upon an "iron note" reading, "I will deliver 1,000 tons No. 1 pig iron,
free on board here, when.required, after the 10th day of September
next, to the party lodging this document with me; f.o.b. (i.e. free on
board) in Glasgow," signed by the defendant. This document had
been issued to X who sold the iron represented thereby to plaintiffs
who paid X and received the "iron note." The Court of Session de-
cided that the plaintiffs having paid X for the iron, the defendant was
liable for non-delivery despite the fact that he had not been paid.
In the House of Lords *this conclusion was affirmed on grounds not
necessary to be noticed here, the Lord Chancellor in the only opinion
rendered being unmistakably of the opinion that the "note" could not
be operative as a negotiable instrument. On the contrary, as an at-
tempt to create a floating right of action in the holder it was invalid,
In a series of cases beginning with Gorgier v. Mieville,9 in 1824,
it was established in England that instruments issued by foreign gov-
ernments in financing operations might possess qualities of negotiability.
In the case just cited a bond issued by the King of Prussia in which
he declared himself and successors bound "to every person who should
for the time being be the holder of the bond" for the payment of
principal and interest in the manner there pointed out, was wrongfully
pledged with the defendant by a bailee of the owner thereof, the
plaintiff. In trover the plaintiff contended that the document, being the
security of a foreign state, was unlike bank notes, bills of exchange
indorse4 in blank, and exchequer bills, which constituted a part of the
circulating medium of the country, the circulation of which would be
materially impeded if they could be followed.2" Abbott C. J. said:
"(1856) 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 1.
"The only cases in which such an action can be sustained are those of bills
of exchange and promissory notes. That depends on the law merchant in the
case of bills of exchange, and on the stats. 12 Geo. III, c. 72, s. 36 (Scotland),
and 3 & 4 Anne c. 9, s. 1, (England), in the case of promissory notes. No
evidence was given to show any general mercantile usage affecting such instru-
ments as that now in question ....... No authority for such transferable right
of action has been adduced in argument, and all principle is against its validity.
...... Bills of exchange have been made an exception for the convenience of
trade, but it is an exception not to be extended. The drawer of the bill gives
to the indorsee a better title than his own, and this leads, or may lead, to many
ill consequences; but mercantile convenience has sanctioned it ....... If the con-
venience of those engaged in trade and commerce requires that scrip notes of
this description should be made legal and valid, that must be effected, if at all,
by the Legislature; and on any measure being introduced for such an object,
it will be for the Houses of Parliament to consider and weigh well the social
benefit and evils likely to result from sanctioning the proposed change." As
to bills of lading see Thompson v. Dominy (1845) 14 M. & W. 403.
'3 B. & C. 45.
Glyn v. Baker (1811) 13 East 509, was relied on. There it was indicated
that India Bonds (issued by The United Company of Merchants of England,
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"It (the bond) is, therefore, in its nature precisely analogous to a
bank note payable to bearer, or to a bill of exchange indorsed in blank.
Being an instrument, therefore, of the same description, it must be sub-
ject to the same rule of law, that whoever is the holder of it, has power
to give title to any person honestly acquiring it. It is distinguishable
f rom the case of Glyn v. Baker, because there it did not appear that
India bonds were negotiable, and no other person could have
sued on them but the obligee. Here, on the contrary, the bond is pay-
able to the bearer, and it was proved at the trial that bonds of this
description were negotiated like exchequer bills."
In Attorney-General v. Bouwens2 ' Russian, Danish, and Dutch
bonds were likened to bills of exchange and promissory notes, a special
-verdict having settled that documents such as these had been sold and
transferred in England by delivery alone and the bearers thereof had
always been deemed to be and dealt with as owners.22 And in Heseltine
v. Sigger23 Spanish bonds regarding which a contract of sale had been
made were classed with Exchequer bills, bonds, and scrip, which pass
by delivery alone. But in Lang v. Snyth24 certain obligations called
bordereaux bearing attached coupons, securities issued by the Neapoli-
tan Government, were considered to be non-negotiable, partly because of
the form of the instruments and partly because the jury had returned a
finding that the documents did not pass in England from 'hand to hand
like money or bank notes. It was objected that the question was
improperly left to the jury. As to this Tindal C. J. said that "even if
it had been incumbent on the Judge to decide what was the nature of
these instruments, there is nothing on the face of them to lead to the
conclusion that they are to be considered as money or negotiable in-
struments." Continuing he said:
"But the answer to the objection is, that these are not English in-
struments, recognized by the law of England, but Neapolitan securities,
brought to the notice of the Court for the first time; and, as Judges,
we are not allowed to form an opinion on them, unless supplied with
.evidence as to the law of the country whence they come. Judges have
trading to the East Indies) in which the obligor undertook to pay the specified
amount to X, "his executors, &c. (by indorsement hereon)" were not so far
negotiable that a bona fide purchaser from the custodian for the owner was
free from liability to account. Le Blanc, J., said: "Even if the case went to
trial again to inquire into the fact of the negotiability of India bonds, the
-defendant would never be able to persuade a jury to find that they were nego-
tiable instruments like bills of exchange." See the remedial statute of (1811)
.St. 51 Geo. 3, c. 64.
n(1838) 4 M. & W. 171.
The question arose in a proceeding for probate. Accord, Attorney-General
-v. Glendening (1904) 92 L. T. R. 87 (colonial bonds payable to. bearer and con-
taining a charge on property).
"(1848) 1 Exch. 856."(1831) 7 Bing. 284.
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only taken upon themselves to decide the nature of instruments re-
cognized by the law of this country; as bills of exchange, which pass
current by the law merchant; dividend warrants ;25 or exchequer bills,
the transfer of which is founded on statutes, which a judge in an
English court is bound to know."
26
The status o f the securities of foreign governments was, how-
ever, effectively settled in the well known case of Goodwin v. Robarts-
which was taken to the House of Lords.2 8 The case arose out of a
wrongful pledging with the defendant by a bailee of the plaintiff of
certain scrip by its terms entitling the bearer thereof to receive definitive
bonds of the Russian or Austro-Hungarian governments, which scrip
at the time of the misappropriation was the property of the plaintiff.
The defendant having turned the scrip into money, was sued for the
proceeds. It was established that:
"The scrip of loans to foreign governments, entitling the bearers
thereof to bonds for the same amount when issued by the government,
has been well known to and largely dealt in by bankers, money dealers,
and the members of the English and Foreign Stock Exchanges, and
through them by the public, for over fifty years. It is and has been
the usage ...... to buy and sell such scrip and to advance loans of
money upon the security of it before the bonds were issued, and to pass
the scrip upon such dealing by mere delivery as a negotiable instru-
ment transferable by delivery ......
The argument centered pretty largely- on the applicability of the
doctrine of Gorgier v. Mieville and Attorney-General v. Bouwens,
supra, and both in the Court of Exchequer and the Exchequer Cham-
ber those cases were deemed controlling despite the fact that the in-
struments in question entitled the bearer not to money but to bonds.
The scrip was "substantially and in effect" a "security for money,
which, till the bond shall be delivered, stands in the place of that
documerit."
2' 9
Some doubt as to these was raised by the decision in Partridge v. Bk. of
England (1846) 9 A. & E. (N. S.) 396. But see Goodwin v. Robarts (1875Y
L. R. 10 Exch. 337, 354, and Bills of Exchange Act (1882) St. 45 & 46 Vict. c.
61, § 97 (3) (d), by which the doubt appears to be dispelled.
" (Italics the writer's). "It has been urged, that in Gorgier v. Mieville,
the case of the Prussian bonds, no evidence was given of the foreign law; but
evidence was gi-;en, that by the usage of merchants in this country, those bonds
passed from hand to hand, which usage could scarcely have existed, unless
they were negotiable by delivery in Prussia, so that evidence as to the law of
Prussia was rendered unnecessary. And the question is, not so much what is
the usage in the country whence the instrument comes, as in the country where
it is passed." Tindal, C. J., in Lang v. Smnyth.
Supra, footnote 25.
(1876) L. R. 1 A. C. 476.
"Per Cockburn, C. 3. (p. 352).
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On the basic problem it was contended by counsel for the plaintiff
that "because the scrip does not correspond with any of the forms of
the securities for money which have been hitherto held to be negotiable
by the law merchant, and does not contain a direct promise to pay
money, but only a promise to give security for money, it is not a
security to which, by the law merchant, the character of negotiability
can attach." After manifestly careful and thorough consideration of
the point and the historical development of negotiability and the part
played by the law merchant it was concluded in the Exchequer Chamber
in a most instructive opinion by Cockburn C. I. that just as the quality
of negotiability became attached to bills of exchange and promissory
notes out of the usages and needs of trade, so even today out of the
same considerations the same quality might become annexed to new
types of documents. It was considered that the law had not become
finally stereotyped and settled as if by some positive and peremptory
enactment.3 0
It is important to notice, because the scope of this decision as an
authority will have to be considered later, that in the Exchequer
Chamber the conclusion was rested on a broad and fundamental ground,
that negotiability has been a product of trade usage and that as new
situations and new types of instruments dtevelop, usage, just as in
days long gone by, may warrant the court in attaching to such instru-
ments the same quality.
In the House of Lords'the decision was affirmed, though an ad-
ditional ground of decision was advanced. It was the opinion of the
Lords that the scrip was in such terms that the plaintiff must be con-
sidered as having represented that if it were taken in good faith, and
for value, the person so taking would stand to all intents and purposes
in the place of the previous holder,-in other words, negotiability by
estoppel."' But by putting the case on that ground it is not to be
of "Usage, adopted by the Courts, having been thus the origin of the whole
of the so-called law merchant as to negotiable securities, what is there to prevent
our acting upon the principle acted upon by our predecessors, and followed in
the precedents they have left to us? Why is it to be said that a new usage
which has sprung up under altered circumstances, is to be less admissable than
the usages of past times? Why is the door to be now shut to the admission
and adoption of usage in a matter altogether of cognate character, as though
the law had been finally stereotyped and settled by some positive and peremptory
enactment? ...... The usage of the money market has solved the question
whether scrip should be considered security for, and the representative of,
money, by treating it as such." Thus the Chief Justice avoided a "narrow
minded" view which in a much earlier Chief Justice, Lord Holt, led to many
uncomplimentary observations.
' Pickard v. Sears (1837) 6 A. & E. 469, was cited as exemplifying the
doctrine.
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understood that the ratio decidendi of the Exchequer Chamber was
disapproved. On the contrary it was expressly concurred in.32
Since Goodwin v. Robarts the English courts do not appear to
have been called upon to determine the standing of securities of foreign
governments. It was some time, however, before there seems to have
been reached a like quiescent attitude toward some other common
securities. Instruments issued by English and foreign companies in
carrying out financing operations have caused some very real problems
and it is possible that there are some still unsettled.
Two years before Goodwin v. Robarts was first decided the Court
of Queen's Bench wrestled with Crouch v. Credit Foncier of England
33
in which the plaintiff whose claim to certain debenture bonds issued by
the defendant, an English company, was derived from or through a
thief, sued to recover the amount of the bond, the events upon which
the amount thereof was to be due and payable having happened. The
debenture in question contained a promise over the defendant's seal
to pay a specified sum to the bearer subject to conditions set forth on
the back thereof. The former owner of the instrument from whom it
had been stolen defended the action, a duplicate having been issued
him on his giving an indemnifying bond. The report of the case states
that:
"No evidence was given at the trial as to whether similar docu-
ments are in practice treated as negotiable, nor was any express ad-
mission made as to this point; but from my Brother Bramwell's report
we think that we must take it to have been tacitly admitted at the trial
that they are so treated, and we must ...... assume that this admission
is correct. As instruments of this kind have only come into use within
the last few years, a custom or usage to treat them as negotiable can
only have begun recently; but we must, in deciding this case, proceed
on the assumption that they have acquired whatever degree of negoti-
ability can be created by any such recent custom of trade."
The court, Blackburn J., writing the opinion, first concluded that
the instrument in suit could not be classed as a promissory note, there
being conditions limiting or affecting the promise in such way that it
could 'not be said that there was an unconditional, simple promise
to pay money, a requisite of a promissory note."- The cases of At-
'The Lord Chancellor said (p. 490): "But my Lords, I have no hesitation
in saying that I also concur in what I understand to have been the ratio de-
cidendi of the Courts below in this case itself." See also the opinions of Lords
Hatherly and Selbourne.
The doctrine of the case was held not properly applicable to post-office
orders in Fine Art Society v. Union Bk. of London (1886) L. R. 17 Q. B. D. 705.
' (1873) L. R. 8 Q. B. 374.
It was intimated but not decided that the same result might be reached
on the fact that the instrument was under seal.
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torney-General v. Bouwens and Gorgier v. Mieville were then consid-
ered. It was stated by the learned judge that there was no intention
to cast any doubt on the doctrine of these decisions, "but we do not
think it applicable to an English instrument made in England; and we
express no opinion as to what might be the law as to obligations made
by subjects abroad, which, by thelaw of the country where they were
made, are negotiable in that country."
The conclusion of the court was that since the power of a holder
to create in his transferee better rights than the transferor had and
the ability of the holder for the time being to sue on the instrument
in his own name were attributes of negotiability, and since under the
.law of England it is impossible for a party to create by his own act a
transferable right of action on a contract,3 5 and since the "ancient" law
merchant did not include a document such as these debenture bonds,
they could not rank as negotiable instruments, and the plaintiff must
fail. Modern custom, it was considered, might enter into and become
under certain conditions, a term of the contract, but it could not deter-
mine the status of the instrument. With reference to securities issued
abroad it was obviously the opinion of Judge Blackburn that, if the
foreign law attached to the contract the feature of transferability and
suability by a holder, for the time being the difficulty was avoided, and
Gorgier v. Mieville and like cases were to be thus explained.
It may be suggested here, parenthetically, that it would seem that
the court failed to give due weight to the fact that it was nothing but
usage that gave to bills of exchange and probably to promissory notes
the qualities of negotiability. When the usage became sufficiently well
settled and recognized by the courts it had the force of law, and thus
came into the general body of our law. Did usage cease to be a source
of law after the common law courts began to alply the rules and
principles of the law merchant? Is usage a source of law only when it
goes through an intermediate stage, the law merchant?
The difference in the positions of Blackburn, I., in the Croich
case and Cockburn, C. I., in the Goodwin case is thus fundamental.
The latter looked upon custom as a constantly contributing source of
law and rather impatiently rejected the suggestion that the law had
become stereotyped. The former aptparently would require legislative
action to enlarge the class of negotiable paper.
I In Goodwin v. Robarts, after laying down the basic propositions
on which the case was decided, Cockburn, C. I., felt called upon to
review certain cases relied upon in the argument by the losing side.
'Dixon v. Bovill (1856) 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 1, and Thompson v. Dominy,
.supra, footnote 18, were relied on for this.
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Among these cases was Crouch v. Credit Foncier of England. After
pointing out the decision therein and expressing disagreement with
Judge Blackburn's view that only usages recognized by the "ancient
law merchant" could determine the negotiable status of an instrument,
it was said:
"We think the judgment in Crouch v. The Credit Foncie" may well
be supported on the ground that in that case there was substantially
no proof whatever of general usage. We cannot concur in thinking
that if proof of general usage had been established, it would have been
a sufficient ground for refusing to give effect to it that it did not form
a part of what is called 'the ancient law merchant.' "
In the House of Lords the only reference to the Crouch case is in
the opinion of Lord Selborne who said: "The Court of Queen's Bench
in deciding that case relied upon the distinction between 'English in-
struments made by an English company in England,' and 'a public
debt created by a foreign or colonial government, the title to portions
of which is by them made to depend on the possession of bonds ex-
pressed to be transferable to the bearer or holder ...... , ,,37
That at least two of the judges8 by whom Goodwin v. Robarts
was decided in the Exchequer Chamber did not consider their decision
applicable only to securities of foreign debtors is conclusively shown
by Rumball v. The Metropolitan Bank,8 9 where the doctrine of the
Goodwin case was held applicable to scrip which certified that, after
the payment of certain installments, the bearer would be entitled to be
registered as the holder of shares in an English banking company.40
In London and County Banking Co. v. London and River Plate
Bank4 . certificates of stock issued by the Pennsylvania Railroad Co.
were considered by the Queen's Bench Division (Manisty J,) not to
be negotiable despite evidence to the effect that on the Stock Exchange
they passed from hand to hand and had been treated there and gener-
ally as negotiable instruments. The basis of the decision was the ab-
"See Goodwin v. Robarts, supra, footnote 25, at p. 356.
" Supra, footnote 28, at pp. 494, 495.
'Cockburn and Mellor.
3 (1877) L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 194, followed in Webb, Hale & Co. v. Water Co.
(1905) 21 T. L. R. 572. But certificates for shares of stock clearly are not
negotiable instruments in England. Colonial Bank v. Cady and Williams (1890)
L. R. 15 A. C. 267.
' There was proof of a general usage among bankers, discounters, money
dealers, and the fiembers of the London Stock Exchange of dealing in such
documents much the same as in negotiable paper; that among such persons
these scrip certificates had been supposed to be negotiable by mere delivery.
Both grounds upon which the Goodwin case went were deemed applicable
here.,(1887) L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 232.
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sence of any language in the certificates indicating that the right of
suing might extend beyond one particular individual. The court then
refers to the Crouch case approvingly and considers it as still good
law despite Goodwin v. Robarts which is erroneously declared to have
gone on the ground of estoppel . 2 In Easton v. London Joint Stock
Bank43 some American railway bonds payable to bearer, as wel as
stock of a Canadian railway company, were involved. It was held
that an innocent purchaser was protected under the estoppel theory
of the House of Lords in the Goodwin case. There .being evidence
that the bonds were customarily transferred by delivery from hand to
hand, Fry, L. J., thought them negotiable instruments in the full
sense; but Cotton and Bowen, L. J. J., were dubious." Several cases
of about the same time dealing with American and South American
bonds payable to bearer and shown to pass customarily by delivery as
negotiable instruments held unmistakably that such bonds were ne-
gotiable."
Finally in two'cases6 decided in 1898 and 1902, litigation in Eng-
land regarding the standing of securities passing in business circles
freely from hand to hand appears to have come at least to a temporary
rest. Both cases involved debenture bonds of the same character as
those considered in the Crouch case. In the earlier of these cases
Kennedy, J., in a masterful opinion in which the problem and the
authorities are fully examined, upholds the negotiability of such securi-
The case was appealed; but the point here considered was not involved.
London & County Banking Co. v. London & River Plate Bank (1888) L. R.
21 Q. B. D. 535.
. (1886) L. R. 34 Ch. D. 95.
"On appeal the House of Lords reversed the decision on the ground that
the alleged innocent purchaser really took with notice. (1888) L. R. 13 A. C.
333.
'London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons [1892] A. C. 201; Venable v. Bar-
ing Bros. Co. [1892] 3 Ch. 527; Bentinck v. London Joint Stock Bank [1893]
2 Ch. 120.
In the case first cited Lord Macnaughten said (pp. 224, 225) : "Then were
these Cedulas negotiable instruments? The Cedulas in question are foreign
bonds with coupons attached, payable to bearer. Admittedly they pass from
hand to hand on the Stock Exchange, and .. they are dealt with as negotiable
instruments. I do not see on what ground they are to be denied the quality of
complete negotiability. In a matter of this sort it is not, I think, desirable to
set up refined distinctions which are not understood or are uniformly and per-
sistently ignored in the daily practice of the Stock Exchange." (Italics ours).
In the Venable case Kekewich, J., dealing with American railway bonds,
said the question before him was whether the bonds were negotiable according
to the law merchant, as part of the common law of England, and he distinguished
the Crouch case on the ground that the instruments there were conditional.
He also pointed out that the evidence regarding usage did not need to be
limited to the practice in the case of the particular bonds in question; evidence
as to the customary dealing with such bonds in general is proper.
"Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v. London Trading Bank [1898] 2 Q. B.
658; Edelstein v. Schuler & Co., supra, footnote 3.
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ties. He concludes that while Goodwin v. Robarts did not purport
expressly to overrule the Crouch case, the ground of decision of the
Exchequer Chamber, which was not repudiated but accepted by the
House of Lords, was inconsistent with the holding in the Crouch case,
assuming that there was adequate proof, as there was in the present
case, of customary negotiation. And in the later case Bigham, J., not
only agreed with Kennedy, J., but held that it was no longer necessary
to tender evidence to prove that such debenture bonds were customarily
dealt with as negotiable instruments.
It would seem, then, that in order that an instrument may rank
as negotiable it must comply with certain requisites (1) as to form and
purport, (2) as to actual use.47
As to the first, there must be a promissory or directory undertak-
ing which though running to a specified payee may fairly be construed
as made also to any holder for the time being.48 Suability by such
holder for the time being is sometimes an additional requisite,4 but in
some situations such ability to sue would more properly rank as a
consequence of negotiability rather than as a contributing cause. For
example, in determining whether a given foreign document is negotiable
" The learned editors of Smith, Leading Cases (12th ed. 1915), in vol. 1, p.
535, say: "It may therefore be laid down as a safe rule that, where an-instru-
ment is by the custom of trade transferable in this country, like cash, by
delivery, and is also capable of being sued upon by the person holding it pro
tempore, there it is entitled to the name of a negotiable instrument, and the
property in it passes to a bona fide transferee for value, though the transfer
may not have taken place in market overt. But that if either of the above
requisites be wanting, i. e., if it be either not accustomably transferable, or
though it be accustomably transferable, yet, if its nature be such as to render it
incapable of being put in suit by the party holding it pro tempore, it is not a
negotiable instrument, nor (apart from the question of estoppel) will delivery
of it pass the property of it to a vendee, however bona fide, if the transferor
himself have not a good title to it, and the transfer be made out of market
overt" See Jones & Co. v. Coventry [1909] 2 K. B. 1029, 1040 (pension war-
rant); Shaw v. Railroad Co. (1879) 101 U. S. 557, 563 (bill of lading).
It must not be concluded that it necessarily follows that an instrument com-
plying with the requisites mentioned is negotiable. What is meant is that
unless the instrument does fall within these requirements it cannot be negotiable.
'In Gorgier v. Mieville (1824) 3 B. & C. 45, the court distinguished (p. 47)
Glyn v. Baker, supra, footnote 20, the case of the India bonds, as follows:
.there it did not appear that India bonds were negotiable, and no other
person could have sued on them but the obligee. Here, on the contrary, the
bond is payable to the bearer, and it was proved on the trial that bonds of this
description were negotiated like Exchequer bills." (Italics the writer's). See
also Partridge v. Bk. of England, supra, footnote 25.
" See the preceding two notes; also footnote 53, infra.
In Partridge v. Bk. of Englan'd, supra, where the court had to decide whether
a dividend warrant which directed payment to a particular individual was a
negotiable instrument, it was proved that such warrants had for sixty years
customarily passed by delivery and were taken as cash. But it was held (p.
423) that "such a practice cannot alter the law, by which such an instrument
does not confer any right of action on an assignee." (Italics the writer's).
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in England it would be vital that it appear not only that the promis-
sory language met the test but it would have to appear that by the law
of the place of issuance the promisor could be sued directly by a holder.
Ordinarily actions for recovery on such instrument would be brought
in the country of issuance and if by the law there the promisor could
be held to account only to the promisee or to someone claiming in the
right of the promisee, it would be rather obviously futile for an English
court to classify such instrument as negotiable, at least in the full, nor-
mal sense of the term. On the other hand, if the instrument were of
English origin and the question of negotiability vel non must be deter-
mined, the court, in declaring negotiability, impliedly recognizes that
thereby a holder pro tempore may sue, and thus sets that type of in-
strument apart from the ordinary promissory undertaking.10
As to the second requisite, there must be proof that instruments
of the type in question in fact do pass from hand to hand after the
fashion of documents admittedly negotiable. Evidence of business-
men, particularly bankers, brokers, and Exchange men, is of natural
importance.51 Proof of customary circulation in the country of issue
would not be sufficient in England,5 2 but proof of such usage in Eng-
land regarding a foreign document is probably sufficient as to negotia-
bility in the country of its origin.53
As to certain types of negotiable instruments, notably bills and'
notes; many years of experience have evolved certain special requisites
' This is really the result of the cases recognizing debenture bonds, etc., as
negotiable." After a given type of instrument has been recognized as negotiable a court
should not listen to evidence regarding its customary circulation or lack thereof.
Grant v. Vaughan (1764) 3 Burr. 1516. Nor will evidence be received to show
a custom in contradiction of an incident found to have become attached to a
negotiable instrument. Edie v. East India Co. (1761) 2 Burr. 1216. See also
Cockburn, C. J., in Goodwin v. Robarts, supra, footnote 25, at p. 357.
"2Picker v. London & County Banking Co. (1887) L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 515.
"' Ibid. This would seem to be a reasonable view, for surely a custom of
free transfer of foreign securities from hand to hand, like cash, would hardly
grow to appreciable proportions if under the law of the country of issuance the
debtor could be sued only by the promisee or in his right.
Since negotiability connotes important consequences (1) as between holder
and maker, and (2) as between successive holders, it is perhaps arguable that
as to the former the negotiable character of an instrument should be determined
by the law of the place of issuance while as to the latter the governing law
should be that of the place of transfer. So far as the indorser's contract is
concerned it may be concluded that he. has assumed the obligations of an in-
dorser of a negotiable instrument; that may well be considered a question of the
scope of the contract which the law of the place of making should govern. See
the problem discussed in (1923) 11 Cal. Law 'Rev. 114. But granting such con-
clusion, the character of the instrument so far as the maker or drawer is con-
cerned is left unaffected; as to him the law of the place of issuance should
generally control. Whether a purchaser from a thief may acquire good title
would seem to be a question as to which the contractual situation has no
application.
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-for example, the doctrine that a promissory note must contain an
unconditional promise. It is noteworthy that the English court has
recognized debenture bonds as negotiable, though not unconditional.
The English Bills of Exchange Act which applies not to negotiable in-
struments generally but only to bills of exchange, promissory notes,
and checks, does not stand in the way of such recognition of new sorts
of instruments as negotiable. As the above review of the English
cases clearly shows, it is not even necessary that an instrument to be
negotiable must call for the payment of money.
The attitude of the English court, assuming the Crouch case is not
controlling beyond its factsf is to be commended. A supposedly
conservative Bench has shown a willingness to go along with business
practices which presumably are founded in commercial needs. As
Lord Macnaughten said in London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons,5"
"In a matter of this sort it is not, I think, desirable to set up refined dis-
tinctions which are not understood or are uniformly and persistently
ignored in the daily practice of the Stock Exchange." Lord Holt
would have escaped a lot of abuse had he shown more of the same
spirit.
It remains to consider the attitude of the American courts.
Bills of exchange, of course including checks, and promissory
notes have been as fully recognized as commercial paper by American
as by English courts. Trade acceptances, which have become very
common, are conceded to be commercial paper, commonly negotiable.5"
Occasional statutory requirements, as, for example, that the instrument
must be payable at a bank, do not affect the general proposition.
United States Treasury notes, not unlike Exchequer bills5" in
form, were deemed negotiable,58 the Acts of Congress authorizing their
issue having expressly contemplated that they should be of such
character. Government bonds have been likewise considered as ne-
gotiable instruments.9 National bank notes,60 in view of the provisions
" The status of the Crouch case, in view of the later cases, has been ex-
haustively considered by Bosanquet, The Law Merchant & Transferable Deben-
tures (1899) 15 Law Q. Rev. 130; also by Palmer, The Negotiability of Deben-
tures to Bearer, ibid., p. 245. See also Willis, Law of Negotiable Securities (4th
ed. 1923) 31 et seq.
Supra, footnote 45, at p. 225.
See Capital City State Bank v. Swift (D. C. 1923) 290 Fed. 505, 506.
"Trade acceptances are today in more general use than any other form of
negotiable instrument, except bank checks."
'T See supra, footnote 10.
Fraser v. D'Invilliers (1845) 2 Pa. St. 200; Vermilye & Co. v. Adams Ex-
press Co. (U. S. 1874) 21 Wall. 138.
" Texas v. White (U. S. 1868) 7 Wall. 700; Morgan v. United States
(1884) 113 U. S. 476, 5 Sup. Ct. 691. In the latter case it was said (p. 499):
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of the statute, and Federal Reserve notes8 ' are unquestionably negoti-
able; in truth they are contemplated as part of the circulating medium
of the country.
The situation regarding postal money orders is not without interest.
In reply to an inquiry from the Postmaster-General it was the
advice of the Attorney-General, in 1872, that the remitter cannot, after
the order has come into the hands of the payee therein, by any direction
to the office at which the order is payable, stop payment thereof. In
the course of the opinion the status of such instruments issued pur-
suant to Congressional direction is considered. It is pointed out that
the statute was apparently taken largely from the English legislation,
but with some important variations or omissions. The opinion is ex-
pressed that the money order is, "to a certain extent, a negotiable in-
strument." The order, under its terms, may be indorsed once, and
the indorsee may secure a new order by application to the Postmaster-
General. "It would seem, therefore, to be the intention of Congress to
give these orders in many respects the character of ordinary negotiable
.instruments, in order that full credit may be given to them, and, con-
sequently that their use be greatly extended.
'8 2
Not many cases seem to have reached the courts. In United States
v. Stockgrowers' Nat. Bank3 a dishonest postmaster had rawn money
orders, payable at an office at some distance, to the defendant. These
orders were sent by the postmaster under a fictitious name to the de-
fendant bank which collected the amounts thereof from the Govern-
ment and placed the proceeds to the credit of the fictitious party who
in the person of the postmaster withdrew most of the fund. In an
action by the United States to recover the amount thus disbursed on
the wrongful acts of the postmaster it was contended, inter alia, on
behalf of the bank that, as settled by Cooke v. United States, "when
the government descends from its position as sovereign and deals in
negotiable paper, it subjects itself to the ordinary rules controlling
negotiable paper the same as any individual." Judge Brewer observed
as follows (p. 914):
"The acts of Congress, under which these and similar bonds of the United
States were authorized and issued, do not in terms attach to them the legal
quality of negotiable securities; but they are such in form and fact, and obvi-
ously for the purpose of giving them the highest credit and the widest and
most unfettered currency, by passing by delivery with a title unimpeachable in
the hands of bona fide purchasers for value."
'U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) §9723.
Certificates of deposit issued by banks clearly may be negotiable instru-
ments. Nelson v. Citizens Bank (1920) 191 App. Div. 19, 180 N. Y. Supp.
747; White v. Wadhams (1918) 204 Mich. 381, 170 N. W. 60.
-Ibid. § 9799.
"See (1872). 14 Opinions of Atty's-Gen. 119, 121.
"(C. C. 1887) 30 Fed. 912.
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"But these post-office orders are not negotiable paper; they are
orders drawn by one postmaster upon another, payable to a particular
person not named in the order itself, unknown save as to the particular
parties to the transaction-the two postmasters and the party who
obtains them-so that the protection which the rules applicable to
negotiable paper would lay around many transactions do not avail the
defendant in this case."
The case of United States v. Bolognesi is reported three times,
twice on rulings on demurrers in the Circuit Court and finally in the
Circuit Court of Appeals on a writ of error to review a judgment of
the lower court.6" The litigation arose out of the fraudulent draw-
ing of money orders by one Marone, a banker and post-office clerk,
payable to the defendants, without having received payment therefor
and without the applications required by law. The defendants, having
paid Marone the full value of such orders in good faith and without
knowledge of the fraud, resisted the Government's claim of reimburse-
ment. It was held that post-office money orders "are not negotiable
instruments subject to the defenses permitted by the law merchant to
bona fide holders for value. They stand in marked contrast to notes
or similar obligations which the government might issue to obtain
money for its own use and upon which it might incur all the responsi-
bilities of a private person."66
If post-office money orders, then, are to be considered negotiable,
it must be only in a very limited sense. Transferability by indorsement
and delivery, though restricted, points toward negotiability, but all in
all it would seem to be misleading and productive of unwarranted
inferences to apply to them the term "negotiable instrument.
' '67
', (1875) 91 U. S. 389.
(C. C. 1908) 164 Fed. 159; (C. C. 1909) 169 Fed. 1013; (C. C. A. 1911)
189 Fed. 335.
'It was pointed out that the money order system was established and
operated in the exercise of "a governmental power for the public benefit," and
that, therefore, the principles government commercial transactions between in-
dividuals had no applications. Noyes, C. J., said (p. 337) :
"Moreover, the restrictions and limitations which the postal laws and regu-
lations place upon money orders are inconsistent with the character of negoti-
able instruments. Thus:
(1) The cashing of a money order cannot, under ordinary circumstances, be
made in advance of the receipt of the corresponding advice. Postal Laws and
Regulations § 1002.
(2) More than one indorsement of a money order invalidates it, Id. § 1007.
(3) After an order has once been paid by whomsoever presented, the de-
partment will not be further liable. Id. § 1009.
(4) Payment of orders will be withheld under a variety of circumstances."
In England postal money orders had been held non-negotiable instruments.
Fine Art Society v. Union Bk. of London, supra, footnote 32.
'The orders being issued in the exercise of a governmental power for the
public benefit there would seem to be no assumption of liabilities by the
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State bonds payable to bearer have been repeatedly held to be
negotiable instruments.8 No doubt the same view would be taken
if the instruments were payable "to order," but no bonds in such form
have come to the attention of the writer. While one of the qualities
of a negotiable instrument is that it circulates freely, in a fashion like
money, and while it is fully established that states may issue negotiable
documents, it is important that the state shall not issue paper pur-
porting to be too much like money. Under the Federal Constitution
states are forbidden to emit bills of credit, and occasionally it has been
a matter of some difficulty to distinguish between the emission of such
"bills of credit" and negotiable instruments.69
State, county, and other municipal bonds, though now fully recog-
nized as negotiable, apparently went hrough a period of struggle for
recognition as such. Speaking of county bonds in Mercer County v.
Hacket,7 ° Mr. Justice Grier said:
"This species of bonds is a modern invention, intended to pass by
manual delivery, and to haVe the qualities of negotiable paper; and
their value depends mainly upon this character. Being issued by States
and corporations, they are necessarily under seal. But there is nothing
immoral or contrary to good policy in making them negotiable, if the
necessities of commerce require that they should be so. A mere
technical dogma of the courts or the common law cannot prohibit the
commercial world from inventing or using any species of security not
known in the last century. Usage of trade and commerce are acknowl-
edged by courts as part of 'the common law, although they may have
been unknown to Bracton or Blackstone. And this malleability to
suit the necessities and usages of the mercantile and commercial world
is one of the most valuable characteristics of the common law. When
a corporation covenants to pay to bearer and gives a bond with negoti-
able qualities, and by this means obtains funds for the accomplishment
of the useful enterprises of the day, it cannot be allowed to evade the
Government. The position of Ihe Government in this respect may be roughly
likened to the position of a municipality in its operation of a fire or police de-
partment.
Money orders issued by express companies, on the other hand, if in form
permitting such classification, should be ranked with instruments admittedly
negotiable.
.Ehrlich v. Jennings (1907) 78 S. C. 269, 58 N. E. 922; Tucker v. Bank
(1877) 58 N. H. 83; Griffith v. Burden (1872) 3.5 Iowa 138; Bond Debt Cases
(1879) 12 S. C. 200; see State of Illinois v. Delafield (N. Y. 1840) 8 Paige
526, 533, affd (N. Y. 1841) 26 Wend. 192; see S. C. (N. Y. 1841) 2 Hill 159,
172; Branch v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund (1885) 80 Va. 427 (semble).
See also Railroad Companies v. Schutte (1880) 103 U. S. 118.
"Craig v. Missouri (U. S. 1830) 4 Pet. 410; Briscoe v. Bk. of the Com-
inonwealth of Kentucky (U. S. 1837) 11 Pet. 257; Poindexter v. Greenhow
(1884) 114 U S. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. 903; Houston & Texas Central Rd. v. Texas
(1899) 177 U. S. 66, 20 Sup. Ct. 545.
" See (U. S. 1863) 1 Wall. 83, 95.
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payment by parading some obsolete judicial decision that a bond, for
some technical reason, cannot be made payable to bearer."71
A seal attached to a promissory note or bill of exchange executed
by a natural person was at common law almost uniformly deemed to
withdraw the instrument from the class of negotiable paper; it was a
bond or specialty, a well known common law obligation antedating the
application by the common law courts of the rules and principles of
the law merchant and, therefore, ranked as such.72  The. Negotiable
Instruments Law provides that the "validity and negotiable character of
an instrument are not affected by the fact" that "it bears a seal."
' 73
But corporate seals, whether of public or private corporations, had
been well-nigh universally held to have no effect upon negotiability.
74
' It is pointed out by the court that such securities had been treated as
negotiable not only by the Supreme Court as in White v. Vermont & Massa-
chusetts Rd. (U. S. 1858) 21 How. 575, but by nearly every state in the Union.
Diamond v. Lawrence County (1860) 37 Pa. St. 353, is cited as a single deci-
sion to the contrary. See the many cases cited in 28 Cyc. 1610.
The fact that provision is made by the legislation authorizing the bond
issue for a sinking fund to retire the bonds does not make them payable out of
a particular fund, hence non-negotiable. Commissioners v. Bank (1911) 157
N. C. 191, 72 S. E. 996.
" Many cases are cited in 8 C. J. 110.
In Porter v. McCollum (1854) 15 Ga. 528, it was held, quite independently
of statute, that a sealed promissory note payable to bearer was negotiable. The
decision was based upon usage of trade, and the court points out that such
result was appropriate despite the fact that at the time of the Statute of Anne,
upon which the court assumes the status of promissory notes in this respect
depends, the custom may have been the other way; that statute did not cast
the law into a mold according to the practice then prevalent.
Speaking of coupon bonds payable to bearer executed by an individual it
has been said: "But since bonds in this form have entered so largely into the
financial and business transactions of the country a more enlarged rule than
that supposed previously to be applicable has been adopted for their disposition,
and the protection of persons receiving them in good faith and for value. It is
not necessary therefore, in disposing of this case, to examine those authorities
in detail, for the rule has now become settled that bonds of this description and
issued in this manner, intended to pass from hand to hand, containing appropri-
ate words for the expression of that intention, are to be regarded as commercial
paper." See Fairbanks v. Sargent (N. Y. 1886) 39 Hun 588, 593.
" N. I. L. § 6 (4). Since this Act is law in all the states but Georgia and it
has already been'held in that state that the seal does not prevent negotiability,
the question of the seal, so far as the problem of status of the instrument as
negotiable is concerned, is no longer of importance.
' Chase National Bank v. Fauro't (1896) 149 N. Y. 532, 44 N. E. 164, in
which many cases bearing on the subject are examined.
In Dinsmore v. Duncan (1874) 57 N. Y. 573, the rule regarding private
obligations between individuals was declared to be inapplicable to the case of
public securities like those issued by the government, intended to seek for a
market "throughout the civilized world." As to such securities the seal is used
not to restrain negotiability, but rather to stamp the documents as genuine.
The English cases, heretofore referred to, show that corporate instruments
under seal might be negotiable. In Crouch v. Credit Foncier, Blackburn, J.,
cast some doubt upon the soundness of such statement as applied to securities
issued by private corporations, but the decision was on another ground. The
negotiability of such corporate bonds was deemed fully established as long ago
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Perhaps it has been sufficiently indicated by the foregoing that
bonds of private corporations containing appropriate words of negoti-
ability are recognized as negotiable instruments.75 The view is declared
to rest "upon the faith that such bonds are expressly designed to be
thus circulated, and to be sold in the stock market like public securities,
and that they are universally so used.1
7 6
Interest coupons containing language amounting to an undertaking
to pay a designated sum at a specified time to bearer or to order are
independeitly negotiable.7 7 But an interest warrant78 may stand other-
wise.
7 9
as White v. Vermont & Massachusetts Rd., supra, footnote 71. In that case
Mr. Justice Nelson said (p. 577): "As to the negotiability of this class of
securities, when shown to be intended that they should possess this character
by the form in which issued, and mode of giving them circulation, we think
the usage and practice of the companies themselves, and of the capitalists and
business men of the country, dealing in them, as well as the repeated decisions
or recognition of the principle by courts and judges of the highest respectability,
have settled the question .........
Indeed, without conceding to them the quality of negotiability, much of the
value of these securities in the market, and as a means of furnishing the funds
for the accomplishment of many of the greatest and most useful enterprises of
the day, would be impaired."
'A leading case in which bearer coupon bonds issued by a private cor-
poration were regarded as negotiable so that a good faith purchaser from a
thief was protected is Murray v. Lardner (U. S. 1864) 2 Wall. 110. See also
Pratt v. Higginson (1918) 230 Mass. 256, 119 N. E. 661, 1 A. L. R. 714.
'See Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Lewis (1858) 12 N. J. Eq. 323, 329.
See also White v. Vermont & Massachusetts Rd., supra, footnote 71.
Evertson v. National Bank of Newport (1876) 66 N. Y. 14; Mercer
County v. Hacket (U. S. 1863) 1 Wall. 83; Haven v. Grand Junction Rd. &
Depot Co. '(1871) 109 Mass. 88; Hamilton v. Public Service Co. (1921) 88 W.
Va. 573, 107 S. E. 401.
'The interest warrant involved in Evertson v. Bank, supra, was as follows:
"$35 Interest Warrant for Thirty-five Dollars $35 upon bond No ..... of
the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad Company. Payable in
gold coin at the office of the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company in the city of
New York, April 1, 1871.
"W. 3. Ermentrout,
"Secretary."
" Such was the conclusion in the Evertson case. The court (Allen, I.,)
said (p. 19) :
...... The instruments are not, upon their face, negotiable; they are not
payable to any person by name, or his order, or to the bearer, or to the order
of a fictitious person. In all the cases to which reference has already been
made, the coupons contained distinct- promises to pay the bearer the sums named
therein at a time and place specified. They were perfect negotiable instru-
ments, independent of the bond from which they had been severed, and were
not only negotiable within the statutes upon that subject and the Law Merchant,
but were intended by the parties to be negotiable."
It was further pointed out that "There is no usage or custom proved that
would give these warrants a negotiable character, even if custom and usage so
recent as one applicable to these instrumelts would be, could change their legal
effect."
The same result was reached in Jackson v. Y. & C. Rd. (1858) 48 Me. 147;
Crosby v. New London &c. Rd. (1857) 26 Conn. 121; the warrants or coupons
containing mere promises to pay, but designating no payee and containing no
words of negotiability. In the former case evidence as to usage offered to
show negotiability was rejected.
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County80 and other municipal"' warrants commonly used in con-
ducting the current and ordinary business of the corporation and as
a means of anticipating its revenues, though in form negotiable instru-
ments, have been held to lack at least one of the common attributes of
negotiability, that of a bona fide purchaser taking free of equities. In
truth the true situation would seem to be that these documents in their
usual form are negotiable instruments, for it appears to be conceded
that they pass from hand to hand by delivery and that the transferee
may demand payment or sue thereon in his own name ;82 for reasons
of public policy, however, there has not been extended to these instru-
ments the common effect of bona fide purchase. It is not an uncommon
assumption that the possibility of purchase free of defenses is a neces-
sary attribute of negotiability, whereas it seems to be" a fact that such
quality was one of later acquisition, worked out by the courts of com-
mon law some time after they began to apply the rules of the law
merchant.88  The case of a past due promissory note is, as stated above,
a sufficient example: quite properly it is called a negotiable instrument,
but a purchaser stands no better than his transferor, at least as to
equities of defense.8 4
It is an interesting distinction which is drawn between such
warrants, on the one side, and bonds, etc., on the other. As pointed
See also the case of dividend warrants. Partridge v. Bk. of England,
supra, footnote 25.
Smith v. County of Clark (1873) 54 Mo. 58, appears contra. See also
McCoy v. Washington Co. (U. S. C. C. 1862) 3 Wall. Jr. 381.
' Wall v. County of Monroe (1880) 103 U. S. 74; Cardozo v. Fawcett,
(Minn. 1924) 196 N. W. 809.
M11fayor v. Ray (U. S. 1873) 19 Wall. 468. Many other cases are cited in
2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) § 856.
In Mayor v. Ray Mr. Justice Bradley said (p. 477):
".... But to invest such documents with the character and incidents of
commercial paper, so as to render them in the hands of bona fide holders
absolute obligations to pay, however irregularly or fraudulently issued, is an
abuse of their true character and purpose. It has the effect of converting a
municipal organization into a trading company, and puts it in the power of cor-
rupt officials to involve a political community in irretrievable bankruptcy. No
such power ought to exist, and in our opinion no such power does legally
exist, unless conferred by legislative enactment, either express or clearly im-
plied."
See language of Mr. Justice Field in. Wall v.* County of Monroe, supra,
footnote 80.
In Wall v. County of Monroe, it is said (p. 77):
"The warrants being in form negotiable, are transferable by delivery so
far as to authorize the holder to demand payment of them and to maintain, in
his own name, an action upon them. But they are not negotiable instruments
in the sense of the law merchant, so that, when held by a bona fide purchaser,
evidence of their invalidity or defences available against the original payee
would be excluded." (Italics ours, except "bona fide.")
"* See the excellent discussion of the position of a bona fide purchaser of an
overdue negotiable instrument by Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper (1918) 31
Harvard Law Rev. 1104.
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out above, municipal bonds and coupons are fully recognized not only
as negotiable but as having the additional quality growing out of bona
fide purchase. As to the latter type of document the government may
lose through the negligence of its officers. As stated by Chief Justice
Waite: "If it [the government] comes down from its position, of
sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself
to the same laws that govern individuals there."'8 5 One cannot but
wonder whether there is not as much coming down from the position
of sovereignty in the issuance of warrants as in the execution of bonds.
Of course as a practical proposition the dangers in bond issues are
probably not so great because, being more infrequent and in larger
amounts, there are more safeguards against fraud and carelessness.
Warrants, on the other hand, are put out more or less as a matter of
daily routine probably frequently by mere clerks.
Somewhat similar reasons would perhaps be sufficient to reach a
like result in the case of receivers' certificates. Being issued by court
order, really by an officer representing the court, there would seem to
be sufficient reason for denying a bona fide purchaser the usual freedom
from equities of defenses accorded a good faith purchaser of a negoti-
able instrument. There are, however, other reasons, ordinarily present,
leading to the conclusion that the certificates are not properly to be
considered as negotiable. They are payable only out of a fund, being
in effect evidences of pro rata shares therein, and no one assumes any
promissory obligations. Besides they normally bear on their face
evidence that they are issued pursuant to a court order which may
well be inconsistent with the claims of a holder in due course.
86
Quite independently of statute, stock certificates and bills of lading
acquired a facility in transfer not unlike that enjoyed by negotiable
instruments; also certain qualities, particularly in the way of bona fide
purchase, ordinarily found in negotiable paper. A bill of lading being
merely representative of goods, with of course contractual undertakings
with reference thereto, and a stock certificate being merely evidence
See Cooke v. United States (1875) 91 U. S. 389, 398.
Turner v. P. & S. R. R. (1880) 95 Ill. 134; McCurdy v. Bowes (1883)
88 Ind. 583; Bk. of Montreal v. C. C. & W. R. R. (1878) 48 Iowa 518. In
McCurdy v. Bowes it was held that a holder of a certificate who signed his
name on the back in connection with an attempted transfer was not liable even
as an indorser of a non-negotiable promissory note.
In McCarthy v. Crawford (1909) 238 Ill. 38, 86 N. E. 450, a receiver's
certificate of indebtedness, which by its terms indicated an expectation that it
would be assigned, was placed by its owner into the hands of a broker with the
assignment and power of att6rney signed in blank, and the broker fraudulently
sold the certificate to a good faith purchaser. It was held that the common view'
regarding transfers of certificates of stock under like conditions was applicable
and the purchaser was protected.
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of a certain share in the corporate property, such instruments clearly
are not "negotiable instruments" in the narrower and commonly ac-
cepted sense. The latter are fundamentally -either orders -or promises
for the payment of money. Stock certificates and bills of lading have
been frequently referred to as quasi-negotiable.
8 7
It must be remembered that "negotiable instrument" is merely a
name given to certain types of documents as to which it has been
determined that certain qualities or attributes exist. Whether a given
instrument is of that type depends on a variety of considerations,
largely historical and practical. Aside from a statutory provision
probably no definition of requisites as to form or content could be
made, and, as has been heretofore shown, new types may from time
to time be added. For the present purpose it may perhaps be safely
asserted that to be a negotiable instrument in the true sense the paper
must either be a promise or an order to pay mioney, or that in effect.,,
Of course it is not meant that any document which contains a promise
or order in effect to pay money is a negotiable instrument; what is
meant is that unless there is that feature about the instrument it is
not in the full and true sense negotiable.
Now other documents, such as bills of lading and stock certificates,
may be determined to have some qualities the same or very much like
those found in negotiable instruments, and so long as the implications
are understood there is no harm in calling them at least quasi-negoti-
able. Needless to say, however, there are dangers, as there -inevitably
will be when epithets play a part in reasoning.
In Shaw v. Railroad Company9 it was decided that a good faith
purchaser of goods represented by a bill of lading stood no better
regarding ownership of the goods than did his transferor. This con-
clusion was reached despite a statutory provision that bills of lading
"shall be negotiable by written indorsement thereon and delivery, in
the same manner as bills of exchange and promissory notes." It was
the opinion of the court that the legislative use of the word "negotiable"
was in its primary sense, referring to transferability and the mode
thereof.00 In the Uniform Bill of Ladings Act, however, it has been
'See 2 Cook on Corporations (8th ed. 1923) §412 and cases therein cited.
Voting trust stock certificates may have the same semi-negotiable quality. Union
Trust Co. v. Oliver (1915) 214 N. Y. 517, 108 N. E. 809.
"Goodwin v. Robarts, supra, footnotes 25 and 28; Rumball v. Metropolitan
Bank (1877) L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 194; Webb, Hale & Co. v. Water Co., supra,
footnote 39.
"Supra, footnote 47.
"......What is negotiability? It is a technical term derived from the
usage of merchants and bankers, in transferring, primarily, bills of exchange
and, afterwards, promissory notes. At common law no contract was assign-
able, so as to give to an assignee a right to enforce it by suit in his own name.
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provided with careful precision that such instruments shall have quali-
ties quite like those ordinarily recognized as pertaining -to negotiable
instruments proper."' Pro.visions quite similar to those in the statute
regarding bills of lading are found in the Warehouse Receipts Act
and the Stotk Transfer Act.
In a rather broad sense of the term, then, bills of lading, ware-
house receipts, and stock certificates, at least in certain states, might
not inappropriately be called negotiable instruments. It is believed,
however, that it would tend toward clarity of thought and avoidance
of error if it were said rather that such documents have come to have
certain of the attributes ordinarily found in negotiable instruments,
leaving the name to apply to the money paper.92
It must be evident from the discussion thus far that both in Eng-
land and the United States a variety of types of instruments have
been recognized as having the qualities of negotiability and may in
the narrower sense of the word be denominated "negotiable." Bills
of exchange were of course the earliest; promissory notes soon fol-
lowed; and beginning with Gorgier v. Mieville a variety of other docu-
ments commonly used in business or financing operation have been
added to the list. Usage and occasionally a statute have been the
basis of these additions. The American cases on the whole seem to
have paid perhaps less attention to offered proofs of usage.93
To this rule bills of exchange and promissory notes, payable to order or
bearer, have been admitted exceptions, made such by the adoption of the law
merchant. They may be transferred by indorsement and delivery, and such a
transfer is called negotiation. It is a mercantile business transaction, and the
capability of being thus transferred, so as to give to the indorsee a right to
sue on the contract in his own name, is what constitutes negotiability. The
term 'negotiable' expresses, at least primarily, this mode and effect of a transfer."
(See pp. 562, 563).
See also Atchison & Topeka Ry. v. Harold (1915) 241 U. S. 371, 36 Sup.
Ct. 665.
"The nature of the provisions of the Act and its effectiveness are mani-
fested by such a case as Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown (1913) 214 Mass. 196,
100 N. E. 1025. As to the status of bills of lading in England in this respect see
26 Halsbury, Laws of England (1911) 167, 168.
"If it be assumed that the uniform statutes regarding bills of lading, ware-
house receipts, and stock transfers, are in force in Georgia, what would be the
result regarding these if that state were to enact he N. I. L. in its usual terms,
there being no express provision either repealing or saving the existing legisla-
tion? Should it be said that the requirements for a negotiable instrument had
in effect impliedly repealed the statutes referred to? It is believed that no
such holding would be announced. Would it not be held that bills of lading, etc.,
are not negotiable instruments, properly speaking, but merely have been given
some of the qualities normally found in instruments truly negotiable?
"In England, as pointed out above, it had been held, on the basis of the
prevalent usage, that corporate bonds* should rank as negotiable paper despite
the presence of features as to conditions and lack of certainty, ordinarily
destructive of negotiability. Thus was shown the length to which the courts
would go in following the practices and needs of business. Whether the
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With reference to possible future additions to the group of nego-
tiable instruments the -problem for an American couft is quite unlike
that before the English judges. The Engish Bills of Exchange Act
'is limited by its terms to bills of exchange, promissory notes, and
checks. It is entirely possible for an English court to give free scope
to usage in the development of new types of instruments entitled
perhaps finally to classification as negotiable. On the other hand the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law is a-statute "Relating to Nego-
tiable Instruments," and by section 1 it is provided in the broadest
terms that "An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the fol-
lowing requirements," etc. As to a document not a bill, note, or
check, an English court is today free to give effect to usage of busi-
ness men and the needs of commerce. But in an American court in
a state where the Uniform Act is in force, it is at least arguable that
the question must be settled by asking whether the requisites as set
forth in the statute are present.
The statute has done a highly desirable service in the direction of
uniformity, and that was its announced purpose. Codification was a
means of attaining uniformity. Only time will tell whether the stereo-
typing effects of codification seriously detract from the admitted ad-
vantages in the way of uniformity.
A striking case is that of The Crocker National Bank v. Byrne
& McDonnellP in which the defendant in good faith had bought cor-
porate bonds, secured by mortgage, from the plaintiff's assistant
cashier, the bonds being the property of the plaintiff and sold to raise
money for the personal benefit of the assistant cashier. The action,
which was in essence conversion, was defended on the ground that the
bonds were negotiable instruments, hence the good faith purchaser
should be protected though taking from a thief. The evidence estab-
lished that bonds such as those in controversy were generally considered
and treated in the business world as negotiable instruments, ownership
therein passing from holder to holder by delivery. In the lower court
American courts were prepared to go quite so far is perhaps not wholly clear.
The attitude of the Supreme Court was indicated in Parsons v. Jackson (1878)
99 U. S. 434, where it was said (pp. 439, 440) : "The uncertainty of the amount
payable ..... is of itself a defect which deprives these instruments of the
character of negotiability. As they stand, they amount to a promise to pay so
many pounds, or so many dollars,--without saying which. One of the first
rules in regard to negotiable paper is that the amount to be paid must be
certain, and not be made to depend on a contingency."
McClelland v. Norfolk Southern R. R. (1888) 110 N. Y. 469, 18 N. E.
237; see Chouteau v. Alle% (1879) 70 Mo. 290, 339.
The situation under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law will be
adverted to later.
" (1918) 178 Cal. 329, 173 Pac. 752.
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judgment was for the defendant.5 On appeal the attempt of the lower
court to distingiiish a line of earlier cases was rejected and it was
held that since the bonds failed to comply with the Code requirements
for negotiable instruments they should not rank as such, evidence
of general usage and practice treating them as negotiable to the con-
trary notwithstanding. Although it was not the N. I. L. according
to which the status of the bonds was tested, the provisions of the Code
involved were quite like those found in the Uniform Act.
If this case had arisen in England, even since the Bills of Ex-
change Act, there would have been no difficulty in reaching the opposite
result. But in California the legal status of such bonds could be
brought into line with common understanding and accepted practice
only by legislative action,96 and the same situation might well arise
in any state, in view of the general adoption of the N. I. L.
To reach this conclusion the court had to distinguish a line of cases
culminating in Kohn v. Sacramento Electric, Gas & Ry. (1914) 168 Cal. 1,
141 Pac. 626. In that case the obligor of certain bonds secured by mortgage
defended a claim upon the bonds by a bona fide purchaser on the ground that
the bonds had been stolen. By Civil Code §§ 3088, 3093, it was provided that
an instrument to be negotiable must not be payable upon a contingency not cer-
tain of fulfilment and must not contain any other contract, and the bonds in
suit read with the mortgage, as it was held they'should, failed to comply with
these provisions. It was found, however, "that at all times mentioned herein,
the bonds and coupons thereto attached, of the kind issued ...... are and were
treated and dealt in as negotiable instruments by the mercantile world generally
and more particularly by bankers and bond buyers and such is and has, at
all times been the usage of the mercantile world in California; that it was
the intent of [the obligor] that the bonds and coupons should be negotiable;
that said corporation always so considered them; and that respondents had
each acted with reliance upon the representations contained in the bonds and
coupons and upon the said usage of the mercantile world." The Supreme
Court of California concluded that in the face of the statutory requirements
the usage, however clearly established, could not prevail nor the status of the
bonds as negotiable instruments be established.
In the Crocker National Bank case the lower court felt perforce bound by
the Kohn decision to the effect that the bonds, as against the obligor, could not
be negotiable, but concluded that as between successive holders it was free to
give effect to the established usage. In (1918) 6 Cal. Law Rev. 444, Professor
Kidd quite rightly refers to this distinction of the trial court as "an attempt
to whittle away an unfortunate precedent by confining it to its exact facts ......
That the precedent was unfortunate would probably be agreed, but it may be
questioned whether the California court in the Kohn case was not driven by the
statute to its regretable decision. Perhaps the blame should attach to the
legislature rather than to the court.
Cf. Pitman v. Walker (1922) 187 Cal. 667, 203 Pac. 739.
'The Kohn case was decided in June 1914. In April 1915, there was ap-
proved an amendment to Civil Code § 3088 as follows: "provided however, that
bonds payable to bearer shall be negotiable, notwithstanding any condition con-
tained therein or in the mortgage, deed of trust or other instrument securing
the same."
This seems to be going to the opposite extreme. So far as § 3088 is con-
cerned any condition may be incorporated in a bearer bond without impairing
its negotiability. Since 1915, however. California has enacted the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law.
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The view of the California court again found application in
American Nat. Bank v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc. 9 7 involving the ability
of a promisor under contracts for the purchase of automobiles to rely
on certain defenses as against a bona fide purchaser of the rights of the
promisee. The contracts which contained acknowledgment of the re-
ceipt of the automobiles, title to which was declared to be reserved to
vendor until full payment of the purchase price, provided further:
"As a part of this contract of conditional sale, it is further agreed
that in the event the first party shall in good faith assign and transfer
this contract, and the moneys payable thereunder, to a third party, then
the second party shall be precluded from in any manner attacking the
validity of this contract on the ground of fraud, duress, mistake, want
of consideration, or upon any other ground, and all moneys payable
under this contract by the.party of the second part shall be paid to
such assignee or holder without recoupment, set-off or counterclaim of
any sort whatsoever."
. On the trial, the contract purchaser in defending an action by a bona
fide transferee of the vendor for the sum agreed to be paid, offered to
prove that no cars had been delivered. This evidence was rejected.
On appeal it was ruled that the offered evidence should have been re-
ceived. In a brief filed by amicus curiae it was urged that the lower
court should be sustained because "large sums of money are now in-
vested by banks and other financial institutions in this state in auto-
mobile paper similar to that here involved"; and because "a very ma-
terial element of inducement to engage in this business is the safety
afforded, or as was thought to have been afforded, by the particular
provisions here in question, without which provisions, regarded as quite
essential in the transaction of this particular business, the continuance
of the same would certainly be less attractive." This argument was re-
jected as being in essence the same point urged upon,the court in the
Kohn case,9 8 and it was held that custom was ineffective to attach to an
instrument the qualities of negotiability if the requirements of the
statute were not present.99 It was pointed out, however, that on the
new trial it would be open to the plantiff to establish, if the evidence
warranted, that the statement in the contract, above quoted, was
intended and taken as a representation on which an estoppel in pais
(Cal. 1923) 216 Pac. 376.
"Supra, footnote 95.
"It is questionable on the case as reported whether such custom could be
taken as established. The brief of amicus curiae made the point, but whether
there was proof in the record to support the statement does not definitely ap-
pear. The position of the court in effect was,--admitting such to be the fact,
the conclusion does not follow.
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might be grounded, and that thus indirectly, or by another road, the re-
sult contended for might be attained.100
In floating large bond or note issues the practice of issuing so-
called interim certificates pending the preparation of the definitive bonds
or notes is common and well-known. These certificates are normally
issued by a trustee and provide in substance that there shall be delivered
to the bearer the specified documents when, if, and as issued. Tremen-
dous sums of invested money are represented by these certificates, and
in commercial transactions they pass freely from hand to hand much
as would the bonds or notes themselves. They cannot, however, rank
as negotiable instruments under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law, if for no other reason, because they do not call for the payment of
money.1 ' A bona fide purchaser, then, from one with a defective title
could not claim protection as in the normal case of a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument. How far the doctrine of estoppel, at
least as against the issuing party, may go towards accomplishing the
same result is not as yet clearly determined by the cases.
In one of the cases cited10 2 the court said:
"While these instruments are not negotiable instruments, yet they
approximate to them, and in some respects the same rules apply. By
these instruments the signers thereof certify that the bearer is entitled
to a certain bond upon the surrender of the certificate. They are as-
signable by delivery, being to bearer. This is a notification to all per-
sons interested that whoever in good faith buys the certificate and
presents it to the signers in accordance with its terms, is entitled to
receive the bond."'0 3
As observed above in connection with the California cases involv-
ing the corporate bonds, the English courts could, even under the Bills
of Exchange Act, approach this problem untrammeled by the specific
'The doctrines of estoppel and of bona fide purchase as cutting off de-
fenses, etc., travel paths frequently close together. Fundamentally social and
economic considerations determine whether the claimed result shall follow.
In these days of dizzy effort to market automobiles can one feel sure that any
worthwhile interest is served by artificially bolstering up the marketability of
the so-called automobile paper?
On the matter of representation, cf. Hudson Trust Co. v. American Linseed
Co. (1920) 190 App. Div. 289, 180 N. Y. Supp. 17.
... Babcock v. National Surety Co. (1919) 106 Misc. 149, 175 N. Y. Supp.
432; President etc. of M1fanhattan Co. v. Morgan (1922) 199 App. Div. 767, 192
N. Y. Supp. 239; Bowie v. National City Bk. of Seattle (1922) 122 Wash. 269,
210 Pac. 498; Hearne v. Gillette (1922) 151 La. 79, 89 So. 23. See also Strick-
land v. National Salt Co. (1911) 79 N. J. Eq. 182, 81 At. 828.
'President etc. of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, supra, footnote 101.
10 (See p. 70). The court cites .Hudson Trust Company v. American Lin-
seed Co., supra, footnote 100, where the question involved certificates of stock
fraudulently issued by an employee of the corporation ultimately taken in good
faith and for value.
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and rigid requirements for negotiable instruments as set forth by
statute. The famous case of Goodwin v. Robarts'"° involved scrip by
its terms entitling the bearer to receive definitive bonds, essentially the
same sort of instrument as those referred to above as interim certificates
or receipts. Without a doubt it would be possible to produce in an
American court evidence regarding the usage of trade and the practices
of bankers and business men generally concerning these documents fully
as convincing as that on which the Eriglish court acted.
While by the application of the doctrine of estoppel by representa-
tion or contract, or some other principle, a result may be reached in
some cases which accords with the understanding of business men and
the needs of the commercial world, the process is cumbersome and only
partially productive of a desirable result.10 5 Professor Moore has
pointed out 100 that
"The motive for the imposition of the duty upon the maker to
the holder in due course at the moment of the transfer of the writing
to the latter is roughly the desire of a commercial state to stimulate
commerce by making more liquid and available as cash, instruments
of credit usually accepted in commercial transactions.'
' 0 7
It would seem to admit of little doubt that these interim documents
present a case for the imposition of the duty peihaps fully as strong
as do bills and notes proper, and if it were not the specific requirements
of the Uniform Act there is at least a fair chance that American courts
would reach the same result as that attained by the courts of England.
For purposes of this discussion there are, generally speaking,
three types of documents: (1) money instruments such as bills and
notes, (2) property instruments like bills of lading, warehouse re-
ceipts, etc., and (3) an intermediate class, of which the familiar interim
receipt is an example, which, while not directly calling for the payment
of money, does indirectly amount to that, and is treated in business
circles as such. That the statute governs the first class cannot be
Supra, footnote 25.See (1924) 33 Yale Law Journ. 302 et seq.; 2 Machen, Modern Law of
Corporations (1908) § 1732.
In Hudson Trust Co. v. American Linseed Co., supra, where an employee
intrusted with signed certificates of stock fraudulently disposed of a number,
it was pointed out that such cases as Knox v. Eden Musee Co. (1896) 1-48 N.
Y. 441, 42 N. E. 988, stood on a different footing because there the certificates
were stolen. See also Babcock v. National Surety Co., supra, footnote 101.
See (1917) 17 Columbia Law .Rev. 617, 618.
Unfortunately courts are disposed to reach results only by the application
of more or less generally accepted formulae; the tendency is to reach a goal
only when a path appears to lead thereto.
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doubted. While no authority directly in point is known to the writer,
it is believed that the Negotiable instruments Law would not be deemed
to prevent the application to a bill of lading of those attributes of
negotiability determined by decision or declared by statute to be proper-
ly applicable thereto. As suggested above, the enactment of the Uni-
form Act in Georgia to-day would not, it is submitted, repeal by
implication the Uniform Bills of Lading Act and other legislation of
like character, assuming such statutes to be a part of the law of that
state.10 8 As to the third class of instruments such judicial opinion as
has been expressed unfortunately appears to be to the effect that the
statute applies. Perhaps this conclusion is inescapable, which it would
be if the language of section 1 ( ), that an instrument to be negoti-
able "must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money," is to be taken as laying down a broad, sweeping,
all inclusive requirement. If, however, it were to be concluded that
property documents, like bills of lading, are not covered, then why
should not the door be open also for exclusion of the intermediate
class calling for something other than noney? If the language of
section 1 (2), above quoted, were to be construed as indicating the
type of paper intended to be covered by the statute rather than as a
sweeping requiremefit for all documents enjoying at least some of the
common features of negotiability, the way would be clear, and it might
be considered that outside the statute there may be a constant, gradu-
ally developing custom or law of merchants which courts are free
to recognize and apply.10 9
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law no doubt has accom-
plished desirable results in many respects. M-Hany of its provisions
have been criticised, and in some directions amendments are desirable.
But the chief objection to the Act is believed to be in its stereotyping
effect, a tendency, inevitably, of all codification.110 The framers of the
'03 See supra, footnote 92. In Strickland v. National Salt Co., supra, foot-
note 101, Swayze, J., said: "We are not to be understood, however, as holding
that no instrument can hereafter acquire the elements of negotiability unless it
answers the requirements of the statute."
'Even this of course would go only part way toward the freedom of action
possible in England; but documents such as the common interim trust receipts
calling for delivery of bonds, notes, etc. and not for the payment of money
ought, if possible, to be recognized as having the negotiable status generally
attributed them in business practice.
It may be suggested that section 196 providing that "In any case not pro-
vided for in this act the rules of the law merchant shall govern," may leave the
way clear for recognition of new types of negotiable paper. But if the legisla-
tive language is to be taken, as above suggested, as laying down full and general
requisites for negotiability, then it can hardly be said that any case along this
line is not "provided for."
' See (1918) 6 Cal. Law Rev. 444 et seq.
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American legislation did well to use as much of the English Act as
they did, but they would have produced a much better piece of work if
they had adhered to the scope of the English Act instead of trying to
cover the whole field of possible negotiable instruments.
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